Personal bankruptcy lings have risen from 0.3 percent of households per year in 1984 to around 1.35 percent in 1998 and 1999, transforming bankruptcy from a rare occurrence to a routine event. Lenders lost about $39 billion in 1998 due to personal bankruptcy lings.
1 But economists have little understanding of why households le for bankruptcy or why lings have increased so rapidly. Until very recently, studying the household bankruptcy decision was very dif cult, because no household-level data set existed that included information on bankruptcy lings. In this paper, we use new data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, which includes information on bankruptcy lings, to estimate a model of households' bankruptcy decisions.
We nd support for the strategic model of bankruptcy, which predicts that households are more likely to le when their nancial bene t from ling is higher. Our model predicts that an increase of $1,000 in households' nancial bene t from bankruptcy would result in a 7-percent increase in the number of bankruptcy lings. Our model also predicts that if the 1997 National Bankruptcy Review Commission's proposed changes in bankruptcy exemption levels were implemented, there would be a 16-percent increase in the number of bankruptcy lings each year. But if the $100,000 cap on homestead exemptions recently passed by the U.S.
Senate were adopted, our model predicts that there would be only a negligible effect on the number of lings. We nd little support for the nonstrategic model of bankruptcy which predicts that households le when adverse events occur which reduce their ability to repay. Finally, controlling for state and time xed effects, our model shows that households are more likely to le for bankruptcy if they live in districts with higher aggregate ling rates.
I. U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Law
The United States has two different personal bankruptcy procedures-Chapter 7 and Chapter 13-and debtors have the right to choose between them.
Chapter 7.-Under Chapter 7, unsecured debts such as credit card debt, installment loans, medical bills, and damage claims are discharged. Debtors are not obliged to use any of their future earnings to repay their debt, but they are obliged to turn over all of their assets above a xed exemption level to the bankruptcy trustee. The trustee liquidates the nonexempt assets and uses the proceeds to repay creditors. Although bankruptcy is a matter of federal law and the rules are uniform across the United States, Congress gave the states the right to adopt their own bankruptcy exemptions. Most states have separate exemptions for equity in the debtor's principle residence (the "homestead exemption") and for several types of personal property. In general, states' nonhomestead exemptions are low, but their homestead exemptions vary widely, from a few thousand dollars to unlimited in nine states.
2 If debtors' assets are less than the exemption levels in their states, then they are not obliged to repay anything to creditors.
Households' nancial bene t from ling for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 is therefore the value of debt discharged and their nancial cost is the value of nonexempt assets, if any, that they must give up. Households' net nancial bene t from ling for bankruptcy is the difference. Households that le for bankruptcy must also pay bankruptcy court ling fees and lawyers' fees. They also face possible nonpecuniary costs, including the cost of acquiring information about the bankruptcy process, higher future borrowing costs, and the cost of bankruptcy stigma.
Chapter 13.-Chapter 13 bankruptcy is intended for debtors who earn regular incomes. Under it, debtors do not give up any assets in bankruptcy, but they must propose a plan to repay a portion of their debts from future income, usually over three to ve years. The plan goes into effect as long as the bankruptcy judge accepts it, i.e., creditors do not have the right to block repayment plans.
Because debtors have the right to choose between Chapters 7 and 13, they have a nancial incentive to choose Chapter 7 whenever their assets are less than their state's exemption, since doing so allows them to avoid repaying their debts completely.
3 Even when households le under Chapter 13, they are obliged to use future earnings to repay debt only to the extent that they would be obliged to use nonexempt assets to repay debt under Chapter 7. For example, debtors who have $5,000 in nonexempt assets are obliged to repay only the equivalent of $5,000 from future earnings in a repayment plan under Chapter 13. Debtors who have no nonexempt assets sometimes le under Chapter 13, but propose to repay only token amounts. Bankruptcy judges vary in their willingness to accept these plans.
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II. Literature Review
Attempts to study the bankruptcy ling decision have been hampered by the lack of household-level data on bankruptcy lings. In an early study, White (1987) regressed the aggregate bankruptcy ling rate by county on the bankruptcy exemption level for the relevant state and other variables. She found that the bankruptcy ling rate was positively and signi cantly related to the exemption level.
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Ian Domowitz and Robert L. Sartain (1999) got around the lack of household-level data on bankruptcy lings by combining two data sources: a sample of households that led for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 in the early 1980's and a representative sample of U.S. households which includes detailed nancial information (the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances). They found that households with more credit card debt were more likely to le for bankruptcy. David Gross and Nicholas Souleles (2002) used a data set of individual credit card accounts to explain account holders' bankruptcy decisions. Their main explanatory variable is lenders' rating of individual account holders' riskiness and their main nding is that, after controlling for the increase in the average borrower's riskiness, the probability of default rose signi cantly between 1995 and 1997. They interpret this result as evidence that the level of bankruptcy stigma has fallen. Neither the Domowitz and Sartain nor the Gross and Souleles papers tested whether households' decisions to le for bankruptcy are related to their nancial bene t from ling, which is a central goal of this study. 3 Debtors may shift assets from nonexempt to exempt categories before ling or use other strategies to reduce their nonexempt assets before ling. Debtors may also default on their debt but not le for bankruptcy, since creditors do not always attempt to collect. See White (1998a) for discussion. 4 About 70 percent of bankruptcy lings occur under Chapter 7. Congress has attempted to make Chapter 13 more attractive to debtors by allowing some types of debts-including some student loans and debts incurred by fraud-to be discharged under Chapter 13, but not under Chapter 7. Debtors are also allowed to le under Chapter 13 as often as every six months, while they cannot le under Chapter 7 more often than once every six years. Chapter 13 is also attractive to debtors who own homes and are in arrears on mortgage payments, because it delays foreclosure. In 1984, Congress adopted a provision intended to prevent high-income debtors from ling under Chapter 7, but later court decisions and lack of enforcement made it ineffective. See Karen Gross (1986) , Wayne R. Wells et al. (1991) , and White (1998b) for discussions of this provision and the relationship between Chapters 7 and 13.
5 Frank H. Buckley and Margaret F. Brinig (1998) did a similar study using state rather than county bankruptcy ling rates, for the years 1980 to 1991. They found a negative relationship between state aggregate ling rates and the exemption level.
6 For theoretical models of the bankruptcy decision, see Samuel A. Rea, Jr. (1984) and Ronald A. Dye (1986) . Buckley (1994) discusses explanations for the pro-debtor tilt of U.S. bankruptcy policy. Reint Gropp et al. (1997) There is also a sociologically oriented literature on the bankruptcy ling decision. Teresa A. Sullivan et al. (1989) examined the characteristics of a sample of households that led for bankruptcy during the early 1980's. Based on descriptive evidence, they argued that households le for bankruptcy when unexpected adverse events occur which reduce their ability to repay their debts. Sullivan et al. also argue that households do not take nancial bene t into account in making their bankruptcy decisions. We test the adverse events hypothesis in our empirical work. Finally, evidence from several sources suggests that the administration and practice of bankruptcy law vary across bankruptcy districts, which may cause incentives to le for bankruptcy to vary across districts. Jean Braucher (1993) interviewed bankruptcy lawyers in four bankruptcy districts and found that they often discourage debtors who have less than a minimum amount of dischargeable debt from ling for bankruptcy, but the minimum amount varies across districts. Braucher also notes that bankruptcy trustees in each district set standard legal fees for Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy lings. Because these fees vary widely across districts, lawyers' incentives to specialize in bankruptcy cases also vary across districts. Both Braucher and Sullivan et al. (1989) have noted that there are large variations across bankruptcy districts in the proportion of lings that occur under Chapter 13, which they attribute to judges or lawyers in particular districts encouraging debtors to le under Chapter 13. But pressure to le under Chapter 13 could make ling for bankruptcy either more or less attractive overall, depending on whether bankruptcy judges in the district are willing to accept token repayment plans under Chapter 13. In our empirical work, we test whether the individual households' decisions to le for bankruptcy are in uenced by the number of bankruptcy lings in their districts.
III. Data and Speci cation
In 1996, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) asked respondents whether they had ever led for bankruptcy and, if so, in what year(s). Our data set is a combined crosssection, time-series sample of PSID households in the years 1984-1995. We run probit regressions explaining whether household i led for bankruptcy in year t.
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The independent variables test three hypotheses: whether households are more likely to le for bankruptcy as their net nancial bene t from ling increases, whether (controlling for nancial bene t) they are more likely to le for bankruptcy when adverse events occur, and whether households' bankruptcy decisions are in uenced by average bankruptcy ling rates in the localities where they live.
A. Financial Bene t
Consider rst the hypothesis that households are more likely to le for bankruptcy as their net nancial bene t from ling increases. As discussed above, household i's net nancial bene t from ling for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in year t is:
(1)
where D it is the value of household i's unsecured debt that would be discharged in bankruptcy in year t, W it is household i's wealth in investigate the effect of variations in bankruptcy exemptions on supply and demand for consumer credit.
7 A Washington Post (February 18, 2000) editorial arguing against changing current bankruptcy law suggests that this is a commonly held view: "Most bankruptcies are triggered by misfortune, not irresponsibility: by illness, a job loss, a broken marriage. America should remain the home of second chances." 8 In order for particular households to be included in our sample, they must have answered all of the PSID questionnaires for the years 1992-1995. Households that are in the sample for 1992-1995 are also included for any of the additional years 1984-1991 for which data are available. We used a balanced panel for the years 1992-1995 because the PSID data sets for 1993-1996 are only available in "early release" form and no household weights are included. We therefore used 1992 household weights for all of the 1993-1995 observations. The "early release" data sets also omit households' state of residence. As a result, we are forced to assume that households observed in 1993-1995 still live in the same state where they lived in 1992. We used the con dential PSID geocodes to assign households to their counties of residence in each year of the sample (up to 1992) . This allows us to assign households to bankruptcy districts and also to use county-level data for the unemployment rate. Because we use the PSID weights, our sample is representative of the general population.
year t net of secured debts such as mortgages and car loans, and E it is the bankruptcy exemption in household i's state of residence in year t. When household i les for bankruptcy, debts of D it are discharged, but the household must give up assets of value W it 2 E it if its wealth W it exceeds the exemption level E it . FinBen it must be nonnegative, since households would not le for bankruptcy if their nonexempt assets exceeded the amount of debt discharged. Although equation (1) gives the nancial bene t of ling under Chapter 7, it also applies to ling under Chapter 13, because-as discussed above-households have a choice between the two procedures and their nancial bene t from ling under Chapter 13 is closely related to their nancial bene t from ling under Chapter 7.
To calculate nancial bene t, we obtained exemption levels by state from 1984-1995 for equity in owner-occupied homes, equity in vehicles, and personal property applicable tonancial assets, plus the wild card exemption (which can be applied to any asset). The bankruptcy exemption variable E it is assumed to equal the sum of these exemptions if the household owns its own home or the sum of the vehicle, personal property, and wild card exemptions if the household rents. Since most states allow married couples who le for bankruptcy to take higher exemptions, we also adjust the exemption levels by the appropriate amount if the household contains a married couple. If the state's homestead exemption is unlimited and the household owns its own home, we assume that the value of the homestead exemption equals the value of the household's home.
9 Sixteen states also allow their residents to choose between the state's exemption and a uniform federal bankruptcy exemption. For residents of these states, we use the larger of the state or the federal exemption.
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The other variables needed to calculate net nancial bene t, D it and W it , are taken from the PSID. The PSID asks questions concerning the amount of unsecured debt and the value of nonhousing wealth only as part of the wealth supplements, which were conducted in 1984, 1989, and 1994 , but it asks the value of housing equity every year. We use 1984 We use , 1989 We use , and 1994 data on unsecured debt to construct D it for each of the years 1984-1988, 1989-1993, and 1994-1995, respectively . Household i's wealth in year t, W it , equals the value of housing equity in year t plus the value of nonhousing assets from the most recent wealth survey prior to year t. The fact that data on unsecured debt and nonhousing assets are only available in ve-year increments means that our measure of nancial bene t is subject to measurement error.
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We include both nancial bene t and nancial bene t squared as regressors in our model of the bankruptcy ling decision in order to test for potential nonlinearities in the effect ofnancial bene t on the bankruptcy decision.
B. Adverse Events
The nonstrategic view of bankruptcy is that households do not plan in advance for bankruptcy and do not respond to nancial gain in deciding whether to le. Instead, they le in response to unanticipated adverse events which reduce their ability to repay their debts. We would like to test the nonstrategic model of bankruptcy against the strategic model just discussed. A strict interpretation of the nonstrategic model implies that income should be negatively and signi cantly related to the probability of ling for bankruptcy, because income measures ability to repay debt. But nancial bene t should not be signi cantly related to the probability of ling, because households' nancial bene t from ling depends only on their wealth and not on their incomes. Conversely, a strict interpretation of the strategic model implies that the nancial bene t variable should be positively and signi cantly related to the probability of ling for bankruptcy, but income should not, because income is unrelated to the nancial gain from bankruptcy. Thus a regression of income and nancial bene t on whether households le for bankruptcy should allow us to distinguish between the theories.
However, mismeasurement of wealth is likely to prevent us from cleanly distinguishing between the two theories. As discussed above, our measure of nancial bene t relies on wealth data which is only collected at ve-year increments. Since current income acts as a proxy for the change in wealth since the last time the PSID collected wealth data, a nding that income is signi cantly related to the probability of ling for bankruptcy could support either theory.
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In our base-case speci cation, we include as regressors household i's income in year t 2 1 and the reduction in household i's income between year t 2 2 and year t 2 1 if income fell, or else zero. We also estimate a version of our model that excludes the income variables, but includes direct measures of whether adverse events occurred.
C. Local Trends
We also test whether households' bankruptcy ling decisions are in uenced by the aggregate bankruptcy ling rates in their localities in the previous year. As discussed above, there are differences in the way bankruptcy law is administered and practiced across bankruptcy districts which make ling persistently more attractive in certain districts. Because we include state xed effects in our regressions, persistent differences between the district and the national ling rates will be captured by the state xed effects, except to the extent that districts' ling rates differ from their states' ling rates. However, an increase in a district's ling rate may also start an information cascade which causes the trend of bankruptcy lings in the district to differ from the national trend. A survey of recent bankruptcy lers by Visa U.S.A., Inc. (1997) found that half of them rst heard about bankruptcy from friends or relatives. Also, respondents reported that they were very apprehensive about ling for bankruptcy beforehand, but found the actual process of ling much quicker and easier than they expected. If households live in a district with a higher bankruptcy ling rate, then they are more likely to hear rsthand about bankruptcy from friends or relatives because the latter are more likely to have led. Their friends/relatives will probably tell them that ling for bankruptcy is quick and easy. This information will tend to make households more comfortable with the idea of bankruptcy, so that the level of bankruptcy stigma falls and individual households' probabilities of ling rise. Higher ling rates then continue the process of shifting attitudes toward a more favorable view of bankruptcy.
We test for local trends in the bankruptcy ling rate by entering the aggregate ling rate in the household's bankruptcy district the previous year.
13 Because we also include state and year xed effects in our regressions, the coef cient of the lagged aggregate bankruptcy ling rate tests whether households are more likely to le for bankruptcy if they live in districts with higher aggregate ling rates, controlling for persistent differences across states in bankruptcy ling rates and for the national trend in bankruptcy ling rates. A signi cant coef cient on the lagged bankruptcy ling rate in the district could re ect local differences in the level of bankruptcy stigma or local differences in the administration of bankruptcy law that make the district differ from the state, or could re ect the in uence of information cascades.
D. Other Variables
We include a vector of demographic variables which may be related to households' decisions to le for bankruptcy. These are the age and age squared of the household head, the head's education level, family size, whether the household owns its own home, and whether the household head or spouse owns a business. The probability of ling for bankruptcy is likely to be increasing in the head's age since age brings increasing access to credit, but eventually the effect should reverse as households accumulate wealth and demand less credit. The predicted effect of being a homeowner is ambiguous. Households that have home equity greater than the homestead exemption have an incentive not to le because they must give up their homes in bankruptcy. However homeowners who have fallen behind on their mortgage payments can bene t from ling for bankruptcy, since ling delays foreclosure. The business ownership variable is particularly of interest since those who own businesses presumably have greater variance of wealth and are less risk averse than households in general. Both of these factors tend to increase the probability of ling for bankruptcy. In addition, owners of failed businesses have a particularly strong incentive to le, because business debts are discharged in bankruptcy along with unsecured personal debts. We expect households that own businesses to be more likely to le for bankruptcy.
As an inverse proxy for legal fees in ling for bankruptcy, we include the number of lawyers per 1,000 population in household i's state of residence in year t. Where there are more lawyers per capita, there is likely to be more competition among lawyers and more advertising of bankruptcy by lawyers, both of which cause legal fees and the costs of becoming informed about bankruptcy to fall. The lawyers per capita variable is predicted to be positively related to the probability of ling for bankruptcy. 14 We also include several state-or county-level variables: the change in average income in household i's state of residence between years t 2 1 and t, the standard deviation of income per capita in the state (calculated over the period 1980 to 1995), and the unemployment rate in household i's county of residence in year t.
These variables capture differences in macroeconomic conditions across bankruptcy districts or unobserved changes in wealth or other variables that affect the bankruptcy decision and are correlated with state or district economic activity. Finally we include state and year xed effects. Table 1 gives the percent of households that led for bankruptcy each year from 1984 to 1995 for both our sample and for U.S. households overall. It should be noted that our sample contains only 254 bankruptcy lings. Over the period 1984-1995, the national bankruptcy ling rate rose from 0.33 percent to 0.88 percent, with most of the increase coming in the 1980's. While the correlation between the national bankruptcy ling rate and the PSID ling rate is 0.67, the PSID ling rate is only about half as high as the national rate. 16 14 The bankruptcy court ling fee is uniform across the country but varies over time, so that it is captured by the year xed effects. Another cost of ling for bankruptcy is the loss of future access to credit. We assume that this cost is proxied by household demographic characteristics and by aggregate market conditions. Because markets for mortgages and consumer credit are national, we assume that future borrowing costs do not differ across localities. (See Staten [1993] for a survey of bankrupts which showed that 73 percent were able to obtain credit within a year after their bankruptcy lings.) 15 We could not include other legal variables, such as whether household i's state prohibits wage garnishment, because few states changed their garnishment rules during our period. The effects of state-level legal rules and other differences across states are captured by the state xed effects. 16 Applying the analysis of J. A. Hausman et al. (1998) to our data implies that, if the number of households who reported no bankruptcy but actually went bankrupt is small relative to the number of households that actually did not Table 2 gives information concerning the distribution of households' nancial bene t from bankruptcy (FinBen it ) for the years in which the PSID collected wealth data (1984, 1989, and 1994) . About 18 percent of households would gain nancially if they led. About 10 percent of households would gain $2,500 or more and therefore have a substantial incentive to le. Overall, a much larger proportion of households has a nancial incentive to le for bankruptcy than actually les each year. Of the households that would not gain from ling for bankruptcy, many have no unsecured debts and no nonexempt assets. These results are similar to those found by White (1998a) in calculations using the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finance, which contains much more detailed wealth data. Table 3 gives summary statistics. Regression I in Table 4 gives the results of a probit regression that explains whether household i led for bankruptcy in year t as a function of nancial bene t, nancial bene t squared, and other variables. 17 The coef cient of FinBen it , the net nancial bene t of bankruptcy, is positive and highly statistically signi cant ( p , 0.001). 18 The coef cient of FinBen it 2 is small and negative, but is also statistically signi cant ( p 5 0.010).
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IV. Results
19 The positive sign and statistical signi cance of FinBen it provides strong support for the hypothesis that households respond to nancial incentives in making their bankruptcy decisions. The lagged aggregate bankruptcy ling rate in the household's district is positive as predicted and statistically signi cant ( p 5 0.023). We discuss the marginal effects of these variables in the next section.
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Both household income and the reduction in income are negatively related to the probability of ling for bankruptcy and statistically significant ( p , 0.001 for both). Because income and the reduction in income could be acting as proxies for unmeasured changes in wealth for the years in which the PSID did not collect le for bankruptcy, as it presumably is in our data, then the underreporting of bankruptcy lings will lead to a slight downward bias in our estimated coef cients.
17 See Robert Mof tt (1981) and Orley Ashenfelter (1983) for discussion of the problems of estimating individual households' participation in social programs when participation is voluntary, but the program imposes an implicit tax on the earnings of those who choose to participate. However, the bankruptcy ling decision differs from the decision to participate in income maintenance programs since ling for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 does not impose a tax on debtors' future earnings. Filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 does impose a tax on future earnings, but the tax rate varies and is strongly in uenced by debtors' option to le under Chapter 7.
18 Standard errors are corrected using the Huber/White procedure, which allows error terms for the same individual to be correlated over time. 19 The negative coef cient of FinBen it 2 probably results from the fact that a few households in the data set did not le for bankruptcy despite having very large positive nancial bene t. 20 We would have liked to take advantage of the panel aspect of our data by differencing out the individual-speci c component of the bankruptcy decision. But running a discrete choice model with individual xed or random effects can be extremely problematic (see William Greene, 1993) . Gary Chamberlain (1980) suggested a method for estimating a conditional likelihood logit with individual xed effects, in which only within-individual variation contributes to the likelihood. But because relatively few households le for bankruptcy, this method is not well suited to our data. wealth data, these results do not allow us to distinguish between the strategic versus the nonstrategic models of the bankruptcy decision. Of the demographic variables, the age of the household head, age squared, the head's education level, and family size are all statistically signi cant and all have the predicted signs. The dummy variable for whether the household owns its own home is negative and marginally signi cant ( p 5 0.080). 21 The dummy variable for owning a business has the expected positive sign, but is not statistically signi cant.
The number of lawyers per 1,000 population in households' state of residence-our proxy for legal costs-is negative rather than positive as predicted, but not signi cant. None of the macroeconomic variables that we included as additional controls were statistically signi cant.
Regression I imposes the restriction that the two components of FinBen it and FinBen it 2 , unsecured debts that would be discharged in bankruptcy and nonexempt assets that must be given up in bankruptcy, must have coef cients of the same absolute value but opposite signs. In regression II, we relax this restriction. We therefore drop FinBen it and FinBen it 2 from the model. We replace them with debts for households that have positive nancial bene t from bankruptcy, or else zero, and nonexempt assets for households that have positive nancial bene t from bankruptcy, or else zero. [See equation (1) .] We also include debts squared, nonexempt assets squared, and an interaction term between debts and nonexempt assets. If debts and nonexempt assets affect the bankruptcy decision equally, then the predictions are that the coefcients of debts and nonexempt assets will be equal in magnitude but opposite in sign, the coef cients of debts squared and nonexempt assets squared will be equal in magnitude and the same sign, and the coef cient of the interaction term will be twice as large and of the opposite sign as the coef cients of debts squared or nonexempt assets squared.
The results are given in regression II of Table 4. They show that the coef cient of debts is positive as predicted and statistically signicant, but the coef cient of nonexempt assets is positive-rather than negative as predictedand insigni cant. We can marginally reject the null hypothesis that the two coef cients have the same value but opposite signs using a Wald test ( p 5 0.082). It should be noted that the coef cient of debts in regression II is similar to the coef cient of FinBen it in regression I (4.76e 2 5 versus 5.66e 2 5 ). The coef cient of debts squared is negative and statistically signi cant and the coef cient of nonexempt assets squared is also negative, but not signi cant. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two coef cients are the same ( p 5 0.335). Finally, the interaction term is negative as predicted, but insigni cant. We cannot reject the null hypotheses that 22 times the coef cient of the interaction term equals the coef cient of debts squared or nonexempt assets squared ( p 5 0.466 and 0.439, respectively). 22 These results suggest that debts and assets play different roles in the bankruptcy decision. For households in our sample, discharge of debts is the dominant nancial consideration in the decision to le for bankruptcy, while the obligation to use nonexempt assets to repay debts plays little role.
In regression III, we explore the adverse events hypothesis further by rerunning regression I, but omitting the income and reduction in income variables and introducing dummy variables for adverse events which the household experienced the previous year: health problems for the household head or spouse, spells of unemployment for the head or spouse (if s/he previously worked), and the household head being divorced in the previous year. 23 The results show that all three of the adverse event variables have the predicted positive signs, but only the divorce variable is close to statistical signi cance ( p 5 0.077). These results suggest little support for the nonstrategic model of the bankruptcy decision, controlling for the level of nancial bene t. The coef cients of the nancial bene t variables remain the same as in regression I. 24 22 The null hypothesis of no joint signi cance for debts and nonexempt assets in regression II can be rejected ( p , 0.001). The null hypothesis of no joint signi cance for debts squared, nonexempt assets squared and the interaction term can marginally be rejected ( p , 0.078). 23 Income and the reduction in income are omitted because they are highly correlated with all three of the adverse events variables. 24 In addition to divorce reducing ability to pay, the correlation between divorce and bankruptcy may re ect the fact that divorce lawyers often counsel their clients to le for bankruptcy. 
Notes:
The sample size for all regressions is 55,487. All regressions use the PSID family weights. Standard errors are corrected using the Huber/White procedure, which allows error terms for the same household to be correlated over time. Table 5 gives predicted changes in the probability of ling for bankruptcy that result from given hypothetical changes in the values of selected variables, using regression I.
V. Interpretation
Suppose rst that the nancial bene t of bankruptcy increased by $1,000 for all households. Then the average household's probability of ling for bankruptcy is predicted to rise by 0.021 percentage points. Since the average probability of ling in our sample is 0.3017 percent, the model predicts that the number of bankruptcy lings would increase by 7 percent per year. Based on 1.3 million bankruptcy lings per year in the United States (the gure for 1999), this implies that about 90,000 additional bankruptcy lings would occur per year.
In 1997, the National Bankruptcy Review Commission proposed the adoption of a uniform national bankruptcy exemption for personal property of $20,000 for homeowners and $35,000 for renters, with both exemptions doubled for married couples who le for bankruptcy. Under the proposal, states would still have the right to adopt their own homestead exemptions, but they could not be less than $20,000 or greater than $100,000. Suppose these proposals went into effect and suppose all states adopted homestead exemptions of $60,000-the midpoint of the allowed range. For each household in our sample, we calculate the resulting change in the nancial bene t of ling for bankruptcy and use these gures to calculate the change in each household's probability of ling. (Note that many households' nancial bene t from bankruptcy is unaffected by a change in the exemption level, since they have few nonexempt assets.) Because more households bene t from the higher homestead or personal property exemptions under the reform than are harmed by the loss of homestead exemptions exceeding $100,000, the model predicts that the average probability of ling for bankruptcy would rise by 0.048 percentage points. This increase is highly signi cant, with a bootstrapped standard error of 0.011. It translates into a 15.8-percent increase in the number 
Notes:
We compute each household's estimated probability of bankruptcy under the hypothesized change, holding all other household characteristics xed. The marginal effect is the change in the probability of bankruptcy for that household. We average these marginal effects over all households, using the PSID weights, to get the results reported in the middle column. The rightmost column converts these marginal effects into a percentage change in the ling rate by dividing by the average probability of bankruptcy for the sample, which is 0.3017 percent. Figures in parentheses are bootstrapped standard errors, computed using 1,000 repetitions of the sample. of bankruptcy lings, or 205,000 additional bankruptcy lings each year.
The bankruptcy reform bill passed by the U.S. Senate in the spring of 2000 (S. 945, "Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999") proposed a more modest change: homestead exemptions would be capped at $100,000. If we assume that this provision went into effect but all other aspects of bankruptcy law remained the same, then the model predicts that bankruptcy lings would fall by 0.0014 percentage points or by less than 0.5 percent. As a result, there would be about 6,000 fewer lings per year. This reform has such a modest effect because only 7 percent of households live in states with unlimited homestead exemptions and few of these households have dischargeable debt in excess of $100,000. Now turn to the effect of an increase in aggregate bankruptcy lings in household i's district. Suppose a single district in a single year experienced an increase in its bankruptcy ling rate equal to one standard deviation of the average district ling rate, which is 0.0054. Then regression I predicts that the average probability of bankruptcy for households that live in that district would rise by 0.094 percentage points in the following year, implying that the number of bankruptcy lings in the district would increase by 31 percent. These results are consistent with local trends occurring in which increases in a district's bankruptcy ling rate cause attitudes toward bankruptcy to become more favorable and therefore individual households' probabilities of ling rise. Now suppose average household income rises or falls by $10,000 and consider the effect on bankruptcy lings one year later. The model predicts that an increase in income would lower the bankruptcy ling rate the following year by 0.042 percentage points, or 14 percent; while a decrease in income would raise the bankruptcy ling rate the following year by 0.086 percentage points, or 28 percent. The fall in income has a larger absolute effect on bankruptcy lings in the following year because it is more likely to affect both the income variable and the reduction in income variable. An additional year of education for household heads results in a predicted decline of 8 percent in the probability of bankruptcy, all else equal. If household heads were ten years older, their probability of bankruptcy would fall by 26 percent. Finally, using the results of regression III, when divorce occurs, household heads' probability of ling for bankruptcy is predicted to rise by 86 percent in the following year. Thus divorce has a large effect on bankruptcy lings, even controlling for nancial bene t.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we estimate a model of the household bankruptcy ling decision, using new data from the PSID on bankruptcy lings. We test whether households are more likely to le for bankruptcy when their nancial bene t from ling-equal to the value of debt discharged in bankruptcy minus the value of nonexempt assets that households would have to give up in bankruptcy-rises. We nd that an increase of $1,000 in households' nancial bene t from bankruptcy is associated with an increase of 0.021 percentage points-or 7 percent-in the probability of bankruptcy, and the relationship is statistically signi cant. However when we separate nancial bene t into debts that would be discharged in bankruptcy versus nonexempt assets that must be given up in bankruptcy, we nd that discharge of debt is the dominant consideration in households' decisions to le. We also assess the impact of two proposed changes in bankruptcy exemptions. We nd that if the 1997 National Bankruptcy Review Commission's proposals were adopted, there would be 205,000 additional bankruptcy lings each year. In contrast, if the $100,000 cap on homestead exemptions recently passed by the U.S. Senate were adopted, there would be only a negligible effect on the number of bankruptcy lings. We nd little support for the alternate hypothesis that households le for bankruptcy when adverse events occur. Even after controlling for state and time xed effects, households are more likely to le for bankruptcy if they live in districts which have higher aggregate bankruptcy ling rates, which suggests that local trends in bankruptcy lings are an important determinant of whether households le.
An important limitation of our study is that it is based on a relatively small number of bankruptcy lings, while alternate household data sets that include information on bankruptcy lings are not available. This lack of data has meant that, although Congress has hotly . "Why Don't More Households File for Bankruptcy?" Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, October 1998a, 14(2) 
